We develop a product-differentiated model where the product space is a network defined as a set of varieties (nodes) linked by their degree of substituabilities (edges). In this network, we also locate consumers so that the location of each consumer (node) corresponds to her "ideal" variety. We show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in prices. Each equilibrium price of each firm is a function of her weighted Bonacich centrality, where the discount factor is an inverse measure of the degree of product differentiation. It is also a function of the average willingness to pay across consumers, which depends on the structure of the network, in particular, its diameter. We also investigate how local product differentiation and the spatial discount factor affect the equilibrium prices. We show that these effects depend on the network structure. For example, for a star-shaped network, we find that the firm located in the star node does not always enjoy higher monopoly power than the peripheral firms.
Introduction
In industrial organization, there are two dominating approaches to modeling product differentiation: (i) spatial competition, also known as the address approach, which was first suggested by Hotelling (1929) and further developed by Lancaster (1966) , and (ii) monopolistic competition, introduced by Chamberlin (1933) and Robinson (1933) and formalized by Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . 1, 2 Each of these two approaches gave rise to large strands of literature and found numerous applications to studying a wide range of economic issues, including location of firms, political economy, international trade, economic growth and new economic geography (see e.g. Helpman and Krugman, 1989; Combes et al., 2008; Fujita and Thisse, 2013) . However, both modeling strategies exhibit some shortcomings. On the one hand, spatial competition a la Hotelling relies on the principle of discrete choice, under which each consumer purchases only one variety, which is either the cheapest one or the closest one to her ideal variety in the product space. On the other hand, all varieties are assumed to be equally good substitutes in the models of monopolistic competition. Due to consumers' love for variety, all varieties are consumed in equal volumes. Thus, industrial organization theory ends up by capturing mainly the two extreme cases of demand structure, while the enormous variety of intermediate possibilities remains almost fully ignored. Meanwhile, it is widely recognized in the Industrial Organization literature (see e.g. Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010 ) that whether varieties are good or poor substitutes is crucial for the nature of competition among firms producing these varieties. However, to the best of our knowledge, no approach to modeling substitutability patterns across varieties that would be both general and flexible has yet been suggested.
The aim of this paper is to develop a unifying framework for studying imperfect competition in a "firm-product" space, which would capture both Hotelling's and Chamberlin's competition as special cases. To be more precise, we develop a new model of price competition, which combines features of both spatial and monopolistic competition, thus encompassing two very different aspects of product differentiation: love for variety and consumers' location-specific taste heterogeneity. As a consequence, our model allows for a rich set of regimes of imperfect competition. 3 Our approach bears some resemblance with Hart (1979) , where the space of varieties is assumed to be a compact metric space, without further specification. The purpose of Hart was, however, very different from ours, since he mainly studied the foundations of Chamberlinian monopolistic competition and cared neither about the existence of equilibrium nor about the ability of his model to generate intuitive and testable predictions.
The salient feature of our setting is that we model the product space as a network, 4 which captures simultaneously two features of the demand side: (i) proximity of each variety to a consumer's ideal variety, and (ii) the binary relationship of direct substitutability between varieties. Indeed, in our model, there exists a link between two varieties/nodes if and only if they are direct substitutes, while consumer's willingness to pay decays with the geodesic distance of a specific variety from her ideal variety. Thus, consumers exhibit love for variety, as in monopolistic competition, but are willing to pay less for more distant varieties, like in the address approach. This way of representing the product space serves two purposes. First, it captures the idea of Hart (1979) , since each network is endowed with the geodesic distance, hence it can be viewed as a compact metric space. Second, we depart from the framework of Chamberlin so that, in our setting, Chamberlin-type or Hotelling-type of product spaces are obtained as a limiting case when the substitutability network is a complete graph or a chain.
To sum up, we propose a new way of modeling the heterogeneity of firms with respect to, e.g., Melitz (2003) , Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) , who place firms in a fully homogeneous (and thus featureless) consumers' taste space, but assume that firms differ in their marginal costs. Instead, heterogeneities across firms that we focus on stem solely from different positions firms take in a product-variety space, which we model as a product variety network. More precisely, the structure of the network begets two effects: (i) the market access effect, i.e. a firm that enjoys locational advantage reaches more consumers, and (ii) the localized competition effect, which means that toughness of competition varies from one location to another, depending on the number of firm's potential competitors. Observe that, unlike standard differentiated oligopoly theory (Vives, 1999) , here, Bertrand competition among firms never exhibits strategic complementarity (except for the Chamberlinian type of competition, i.e. when the network is a complete graph). This is because prices of firms producing direct substitutes of a specific firm's variety are strategic complements for the firm's price, while prices of second-order substitutes are strategic substitutes.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we totally characterize the Nash equilibrium in terms of prices for any possible network and show that the equilibrium price of each firm is a function of her weighted Bonacich centrality, 5 where the discount factor is an inverse measure of the degree of global product differentiation. It is also a function of the average willingness to pay across consumers, which depends on the structure of the network, in particular, the diameter of the network. Second, we investigate how local product differentiation γ affects the equilibrium prices. We find that, when products are highly differentiated, a small reduction in the degree of differentiation makes competition tougher and reduces all prices. However, the magnitude of price reduction depends on both the network structure and the distance decay factor. If, for example, we consider a star-shaped network, we find that the firm located in the star node does not always enjoy higher monopoly power than the other firms. This is because the firm located at the star node has better access to the market than the periphery firms, but it also faces tougher competition (all peripheral firms instead of one). Which of the two effects prevails depends on the value of the product substitutability parameter γ. Third, we study how φ, the spatial discount factor, which captures the fact that there is an "exponential decay" of the attractiveness of varieties with distance, affects equilibrium prices. We show that, for sufficiently low values of γ, an increase in the spatial discount factor φ leads to higher prices. The intuition behind this result is as follows: when φ increases, firm i will have less monopoly power over consumer i, but better access to all the other consumers. The latter effect clearly dominates the former when γ is not too large. When γ is sufficiently large, the opposite may occur, for which we have examples obtained via simulations.
We also reformulate our model in terms of transportation cost t instead of spatial discount factor φ and show that the comparative statics results obtained for t are similar to the ones obtained for φ.
We also investigate the case of symmetric equilibrium, in which all firms charge the same price. We show that, if the product-variety network is regular (i.e. all nodes have the same number of links) and γ is small enough, then if we add links in the network keeping the number of nodes constant (so that competition becomes less localized), there exist two threshold values of the spatial discount factor, φ, φ, such that the competition effect (competition becomes tougher when new links are added) dominates the market access effect (adding new links skews the distribution of distances in the network toward zero, thus bringing all consumers closer to each firm) if and only if φ < φ < φ. Otherwise, the market access effect dominates the competition effect. This is because, when adding new links, the market access effect drives prices upwards while the competition effect leads to a reduction in prices.
Finally, we investigate other implications of our model. In particular, we calculate the Herfindahl index to measure market competitiveness. We show that it depends on the network structure and that denser networks do not always have more market competitiveness.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. In the next section, we review the related literature and highlight our contribution. In Section 3, we describe our model and determine the Nash equilibrium. In particular, we illustrate our results with two extreme cases of competition: the Chamberlinian competition for which the network is complete and the Chen-Riordan competition for which the network has a star shaped. We perform the comparative-statics exercises of our model in Section 4. Symmetric equilibria are analyzed in Section 5. The implications of our model are investigated in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Related literature
Our model can be viewed as a further development of monopolistic competition models (Matsuyama, 1995) where the network represents both the consumer and the variety space. There is a theoretical literature on games on networks where, as in our model, the network is explicitly modeled as a graph and the payoff functions are linear-quadratic (see, in particular, Ballester et al., 2006; Bramoullé et al., 2014; Calvó-Armengol et al., 2009 ). The focus and results are, however, very different to ours. There is also a growing literature that models price competition between firms with an explicit network. Two important papers in this literature are that of Bloch and Quérou (2013) and Candogan et al. (2012) . 6 Bloch and Quérou (2013) study optimal monopoly pricing in the presence of network externalities across consumers. The setting proposed by these authors involves a homogeneous good produced by a monopolist, and many consumers whose probability to purchase the good. Candogan et al. (2012) develop a similar approach, but with a divisible good. 7 In contrast to these papers, we account for product differentiation and consider a price-setting game among several firms. There is also an interesting literature on more general aspect of industrial organization and networks. However, most papers in this literature (Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez, 2001; Goyal and Joshi, 2003; Westbrock, 2010; König, 2013; König et al., 2014) introduce the network through R&D collaborations. We believe we are the first to apply the toolkit of games on networks to modeling competition in product-variety space within an address approach. 8 To be precise, the main novelty of our modeling strategy compared to the previous literature may be described as follows. First, the ideal variety of each consumer, or, equivalently, consumer's location in a "firm-product" space, is a node in the network. Second, the geodesic distance between nodes measures the degree of taste heterogeneity. In addition, the degree of pairwise substituability between product varieties is high (low) -or, equivalently, firms are (are not) involved into headto-head competition -when there is a link (there is no link) between the corresponding nodes. In other words, the principal role of a network in our model is that it captures the substitutability relationship between differentiated products. This is to be sharply contrasted with the modern "non-spatial" paradigm of international trade (Ottaviano et al., 2002; Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Dhingra, 2013; Mayer et al., 2014) , where the substitution term is the same across the uniform -and hence featureless -space of varieties, regardless of firm heterogeneity. 9 The relationship of our work to this strand of literature is best described as follows. Recent studies of monopolistic competition under variable elasticity of substitution (Behrens and Murata, 2007; Zhelobodko et al., 2012; Parenti et al., 2014) are dealing with more and more general classes of symmetric consumers' utilities, remaining, however, within the non-spatial paradigm. We, instead, choose to study the consequences of a general network structure of the product space. This is done at the cost of working with a relatively specific family of utilities (namely, linear-quadratic), which are well known to be best suited for studying games on networks (Jackson and Zenou, 2015).
Finally, our paper echoes the logit model of product differentiation (Anderson et al., 1992; Anderson et al., 1995) , in which combining the ideal variety approach and the love for variety approach is achieved by introducing a probabilistic choice on the consumers' side. We differ from these authors by stressing the role of topology of the product space, which we model by means of a network.
3 The model 3 
.1 Notations and definitions
There are N firms that produce N different varieties, each firm i = 1, ..., N producing one variety i. Each firm/variety is embedded into a network (N , G), where each variety i ∈ N ≡ {1, 2, ..., N } is a node, while G = (g ij ) i,j=1...N is the adjacency matrix that keeps track of the substituability between varieties in the network. To be more precise, there is a link (i.e. g ij = 1) between varieties i and j if and only if these two varieties are direct substitutes. 10 Otherwise, a link does not exist, i.e. g ij = 0. By convention, g ii = 0. Quite naturally, g ij = g ji so that the network is undirected, which implies that G is a square (0, 1) symmetric matrix with zeros on its diagonal.
We have the following standard network-related definitions. A walk in a network (N , G) refers to a sequence of nodes, i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , . . . , i L−1 , i L such that i l i l+1 ∈ G for each l from 1 to L − 1. The length of the walk is the number of links in it, or L − 1. A path in a network (N, G) is a walk in (N, G), i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , . . . , i K−1 , i K , such that all the nodes are distinct. The (geodesic) distance d ij between two nodes i and j in a network is the length of a shortest path between them. The sth power G s = G × (s times) ... G of the adjacency matrix G keeps track of indirect connections in G. More precisely, the coefficient g In our model, the further away the distance between two products, the less substitute are these products. As a result, the distance between two products in the network measures the degree of substituability between these two products so that the higher is the distance, the less 10 To simplify the notations, G denotes both the network and the adjacency matrix.
substitute are these products. In other words, the network (N , G) plays the role of a "firm-product" space in the model and captures the degree of substitution between N varieties supplied in the economy. Because we do not impose any specific assumptions about the network structure (except in Section 5, which mainly serves for illustrative purposes), we find that our approach is flexible enough to encompass different types of imperfect competition, commonly studied in the industrialorganization literature. Figure 1 illustrates some of these networks. For example, Chamberlian competition (due to Chamberlin, 1933) corresponds to the complete network ( Figure 1a ), Hotelling competition (due to Hotelling, 1929) to the line or chain network (Figure 1b ), Salop competition (due to Salop, 1979) to the circle network ( Figure 1c ) and the Chen-Riordan competition (due to Chen and Riordan, 2008) to the star network ( Figure 1d ).
[Insert F igure 1 here]
Consumers
We have seen that a network is set of varieties (nodes) linked by their degrees of substituabilities (edges). In the network, we can also locate consumers so that the location of each consumer k = 1, ..., N corresponds to her "ideal" variety. As a result, there are as many consumers as varieties.
Preferences
A consumer located at location/node k ∈ N , i.e. whose ideal variety is k, has the following linear-quadratic utility function:
where x 0k is the level of consumption of an outside good, x ik is the volume of consumer k's purchases of variety produced by firm i (i.e. located at node i) whereas α ik is the consumer-specific willingness to pay for variety i. Quite naturally, we assume that α ik is a decreasing function of the (geodesic) distance d ik in the network between variety i and the ideal variety of consumer k. Furthermore, the coefficients γ ij depend on the topology of the network (N , G). More specifically, we assume that γ ij ≡ γg ij (where γ > 0 is a positive substitution parameter) so that only direct substitutes for which g ij = 1 have an impact on the utility function. In other words, γ captures the global substitution effect while g ij accounts for local substitution effect. Observe that γ ij is network specific but not consumer specific. A higher γ means that varieties are less differentiated and thus the consumption of close substitutes reduces the utility of consuming variety i. As in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) , we assume that
where 0 < φ < 1 is a spatial discount factor. This captures the fact that there is an "exponential decay" of the attractiveness of varieties with distance. Observe that the term i∈N α ik x ik captures the proximity of other varieties to the ideal variety of consumer k and depends on the location of k in the network (i.e. her ideal product). It is referred to as the proximity network effect. On the other hand, the term 1 2 i∈N x 2 ik + i,j∈N γ ij x ik x jk accounts for the consumer's love for variety but does not depend on her position on the network. This is referred to as the love-for-variety effect.
At this stage, we find useful to compare our approach to modeling product differentiation with the standard approaches used in the literature. On the one hand, in love-for-variety models of market competition (monopolistic competition) with linear-quadratic utility (e.g. Ottaviano On the other hand, in spatial competition models (Hotelling, 1929 ; Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010, Chap. 5), the transportation cost is a measure of product differentiation. Our setting differs from both these frameworks in at least two respects. First, instead of α, we have here α ik , defined by (2), which depends on the location of the consumer k in the network, while the spatial discount factor φ is a counterpart of the commuting cost in models a la Hotelling. 11 Second, instead of γ, we have here γ ij ≡ γg ij , which depends on the structure of the network. To sum up, we have an essentially multi-dimensional description of how differentiated varieties are, given by φ, γ, and the network G. Indeed, φ keeps track of the degree to which a consumer's valuation of the ideal variety exceeds that of any other variety, γ measures the degree of love for variety and G captures the topology of the product space, which affects the interplay between φ and γ.
To illustrate the nature of the terms with φ and γ in the utility function (1), consider the star network of Figure 1d (Chen-Riordan competition with N = 4). In that case, for the consumer whose ideal variety is the star (node k = 1), we have
while, for any peripheral agent, that is the consumer whose ideal variety is 2 for example, we have:
Observe that the substitution effect is global and network specific (so it is the same within each network and thus peripheral consumers 2, 3 and 4 will have the same value) while the willingnessto-pay effect is consumer specific.
For the Salop competition, the network is regular of order 2, which means that each variety has two direct substitutes. In that case, for example, for the consumer whose ideal variety is k = 1, we have:
Let us compare these two terms for these two different networks. Consider first the proximity network effect. In Chen-Riordan competition (star network), all varieties are relatively close to each other so consumers do not lose too much from consuming other varieties than their ideal one while, the reverse occurs for the Salop competition (circle network) where some variety can be as far as 2 edges away and, in the case of N varieties, one can be as far as N/2 edges away. As a result, consumers have more utility in terms of proximity effect in the star network than in the circle network. If we now consider the love-for-variety effect, then we have the opposite. Indeed, the Chen-Riordan competition implies that many varieties (the ones located at the periphery of the network) are not direct substitutes (because they have a good match with local consumers' tastes, while consumers' tastes are very heterogeneous across locations) and compete with only one variety (the one located in the center of the network), which is a direct substitute for any "local" variety. On the contrary, in the Salop competition, each variety competes only with its two nearest neighbors. Therefore, consumers obtain more utility in terms of the love-for-variety effect in the circle network than in the star network. As a result, there is a trade off between different networks (or competition regimes) that we want to study in equilibrium.
Observe that when φ = 1, then no consumer has ideal variety. If, in addition, the network is complete (Chamberlin network of Figure 1a ), we are back to the standard representative consumer's approach, where only the love for-variety effect matters, while the proximity network effect does not.
Individual demand
Let us write the utility function (1) in vector-matrix form. We have:
where
The utility function (3) is strictly concave if and only if:
Consumer k seeks to maximize her utility (3) with respect to (x 0 , x) subject to the budget constraint:
where Y k is consumer k's income whereas p = (p i ) i∈N is the price vector. Plugging the value of x 0k from this budget constraint into (3) yields:
If we assume that min k∈N {Y k } is sufficiently high, then the inverse demand of consumer k for variety i ∈ N is given by:
or, in vector-matrix form,
By solving (6) for x k , we obtain the vector of consumer k's individual demands for all varieties:
then B can be expanded in a power series as follows: 12
Following Bonacich (1987) and using (9), we may define the vector of weighted Bonacich centrality measures of varieties as:
where u is any N ×1 vector. In the coordinate form, we have:
ij , or equivalently
ii − γ 3 g [3] ii + . . .
ij is the number of walks of length s in the network, which starts at variety i and ends at variety j (see Section 3.1). In particular, g [2] ii is just the number of neighbors (i.e. direct substitutes) of variety i while g [3] ii is the number of triangles involving i, i.e. the number of couples of direct substitutes which are also good substitutes for each other. As can be seen from (11) , b ii can be viewed as a firm-specific measure for toughness of competition faced by a firm producing variety i. When firm i's closest competitors also compete with each other, this relaxes the burden of competition borne by firm i. That is why g [3] ii enters (11) with the negative coefficient (−γ) 3 . The cycles of higher orders are also accounted for, but their weight decays exponentially with s.
The intuition behind the matrix B (−γ, G) and the Bonacich centrality measure (10) in our context can be further clarified using the demand system (7) . Indeed, B (−γ, G) is the Slutsky matrix of the consumers' demand, while the Bonacich centrality measure can serve to directly compute the responses of quantities purchased to changes in prices. More precisely, consider a vector dp of changes in prices. Then, a vector of corresponding changes in the quantities purchased by each consumer k will be given by
To sum up, a variety that has a higher (lower) Bonacich centrality in the product-variety network means that the demand for this variety is more (less) sensitive to changes in prices.
Observe also that, in the literature on games on networks (Jackson and Zenou, 2015), the (weighted) Bonacich centrality is usually defined as
so that there are no negative terms. Here, we have a different definition that allows for negative values of the decay factor, which in fact, is also considered in the original article of Bonacich (1987) . Indeed, Bonacich (1987) discusses the interpretation of his centrality measure when the decay factor alternates between negative and positive values. In our case, this means that even powers of G are weighted positively and odd powers negatively. This implies that having many direct ties (degree) contributes negatively to centrality, but, if one's connections themselves have many connections, so that there are many paths of length two, centrality is augmented.
To gain more intuition about the nature of individual demands, we can write (7) as follows:
The individual demand (12) of consumer k for variety i is made of three terms. First, the intercept of the individual demand,
, which is the maximum demand for this variety if prices were equal to zero. It is, in fact, the weighted Bonacich centrality of variety i for consumer k, where the weights are the exponential decay factors φ d jk since
where N l (k) is the set of nodes (varieties) such that the geodesic distance between i and k equals l, where i ∈ N l (k). This means that, if a consumer is very "central", i.e. she is close to all varieties in the network (like the star in the Chen-Riordan competition network in Figure 1d ), then this consumer's willingness to pay is very high. Observe that the intercept of the individual demand is the only part of the demand function which is individual specific and depends of the consumer k's position in the network.
Second, the own price effect b ii p i captures the effect of price of variety i on its own demand. The marginal impact of the price p i on demand x * ik is equal to b ii , which is, by (11) , the discounted number of cycles involving i. Thus, b ii is network specific, but not individual specific. Finally, the last term j∈N ,i =j b ij p j comprises the cross-price effects and has a similar interpretation as b ii p i . This means that the price effect crucially depends on the structure of the network so that a complete network will have very different price effect than a star network. Let us illustrate these different results with two opposite types of competition: the Chamberlinian (complete network) and the Chen-Riordan competition (star network).
Examples Consider the Chamberlinian competition (Figure 1a) with N varieties. In this case, G has only two distinct eigenvalues, λ 1 = N − 1, λ 2 = λ 3 = ... = λ N = −1. Hence, (4) and (8) boil down to γ < 1/(N − 1). Consider the case of N = 4. Then, if γ < 1/3, we have:
and
As a result, the individual demand (say for individual 1) for all four varieties is given by:
On the contrary, under Chen-Riordan competition (Figure 1d ) with N varieties, the eigenvalues of are:
Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition for (4) and (8) to hold is γ < 1/ √ N − 1. For N = 4 and γ < 1/ √ 3, we have (1 is the star variety):
As a result, the individual demand for individual 1 (whose ideal variety is the star variety) for all four varieties is given by:
The individual demand for all four varieties of a peripheral consumer, say individual 2, whose ideal variety is variety 2, is given by:
First, as stated above, the network-specific effect on the individual demand, that is the price effect, is the same for all consumers (star and peripheral) in the network as can be seen by the terms after the intercept. We see that (i) own price effect, ∂x * ik /∂p i , is always negative for the demand of each consumer and for each variety, (ii) the cross-price effects, ∂x * ik /∂p j , j = i, are positive (negative) if and only if either i or j is the star (both i and j are peripheral varieties). In other words, any peripheral variety is a gross substitute for the star (central) variety (positive effect) while peripheral varieties come to be gross complements to each other (negative effect). This is very different from what we find in the Chamberlinian type of competition (see (14) ) where all varieties are direct substitutes to each other. Indeed, ∂x * ik /∂p j = γ > 0, j = i. Second, consider the intercept in the demand function, which is individual specific and depends on the position in the network. We can see that, for the star variety, which is at distance 1 to every other variety, the consumer's demand is much higher than for any other peripheral variety.
Aggregate demand
We now turn to deriving the aggregate demand for variety i. Using (7), it is straightforward to see that the vector X * ≡ k∈N x * k of aggregate demands faced by firms is given by:
Define the vector of average willingness to pay across consumers as
where d ≡ max i,k∈N d ik is the diameter of the network while N l (i) is the number of nodes (varieties) whose geodesic distance from node i equals l. In particular, N 1 (i) is the degree of node i. Using (17) and (16), we can write aggregate demand for variety i as follows:
where b ij are the elements of B ≡ B (−γ, G) (see (11)).
In order to guarantee that expressions (18) make economic sense, we have to require that the choke-off price of aggregate demand for each variety is positive. In other words, the following inequalities must hold:
Observe that (19) always holds when γ is sufficiently close to zero, i.e. when the degree of local product differentiation is not very low. Indeed, as implied by (11), we have:
A sufficient condition for (19) to hold is that B is a strictly diagonally dominant matrix with
Because of (20), (21) also holds when γ is small enough.
Firms
Each firm i ∈ N faces the aggregate demand (18) for its variety, and seeks to maximize its profit given by π i ≡ p i X i . Using (18) yields: 13
where b ij are the elements of B (see (11)). Firm i chooses p i that maximizes (22) . The first-order conditions are given by
where i ∈ N .
Since π i is strictly concave in p i , second-order conditions hold automatically, given that the first-order condition holds.
Solving (23) for p i , we obtain the best-reply function of firm i:
An interesting result here is that, except when the network is of Chamberlinian type, our price competition game (Bertrand game) never exhibits strategic complementarities in prices while, in the literature on Bertrand competition without networks, most games have strategic complementarities (see Vives, 1999) . Indeed, it is easily verified that
Observe that, when (8) holds, b ii > 0. However, this is not necessarily true for b ij . More precisely, b ij > 0 if and only if the geodesic distance between i and j is even while the opposite is true when geodesic distance between i and j is odd. As a result, it should be clear from (25) that, to have strategic complementarities, all b ij s have to be negative. This is the case only under Chamberlinian type of network (Figure 1a) . Indeed, the network is complete so that all firms are in direct competition with each other and we are back to the standard case with no network. In that case, if the direct competitors of firm i decrease their prices, they will attract more consumers and thus i's best-reply is to also decrease her price. Consider now the Chen-Riordan type of network ( Figure 1d ). In that case, b 12 
is negative if and only if either i or j is the star (node 1) while b ij is positive if and only if both i and j are peripheral nodes. Here, the game does not exhibit strategic complementarities. The same reasoning applies to strategic substituabilities, which requires that all b ij s have to be positive. This is impossible here because each node needs to be connected to another node and thus some b ij s have to be negative. As a result, in most cases, our price-competition game with networks exhibits neither strategic complementarities nor strategic substituabilities.
Another interesting implication of (25) is that, when g ij = 1, i.e. when products i and j are neighbors in the substitutability network, then, as implied by (11), (25) boils down to
Hence, γ yields a first-order approximation for ∂p * i /∂p j when firms i and j produce highly substitutable varieties. Based on that, we find it legitimate to refer to γ as toughness of local competition in what follows.
Equilibrium
An equilibrium price vector is a non-negative solution of (23), or, equivalently, a fixed point of the best-reply mapping given by (24) .
The following proposition shows that a unique equilibrium exists when the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently high. Proposition 1. Assume that the value of γ is low enough for both (8) and (21) to hold. Then, there exists a unique interior Nash equilibrium (p * , X * ) where p * is given by
with
and where X * is given by (18) .
To better understand these results, let us calculate the equilibrium for the two extreme cases of competition: Chamberlinian competition (complete network in Figure 1a ) and Chen-Riordan competition (star network in Figure 1d ).
Chamberlinian competition Consider the complete network in Figure 1a with N = 4 varieties. If γ < 1/3, then the unique (symmetric) Nash equilibrium is given by:
Chen-Riordan competition Consider the complete network in Figure 1d with N = 4 varieties. If γ < 1/ √ 3, then the unique Nash equilibrium is:
It can easily be verified that, when γ is sufficiently small, the price and the aggregate demand of the star (central) variety is higher than that of the others.
Comparative statics
Let us now examine how the different parameters of the model affect the equilibrium prices. We will consider the effect of γ, the degree of product differentiation and φ, the spatial discount factor, on equilibrium prices.
A change in the degree of toughness of local competition γ
In general, how prices p * and aggregate demand X * vary with γ, which is the inverse measure of product differentiation, looks pretty complicated and is general ambiguous. However, it turns out to be possible to obtain a sharp result for the case when γ is close to zero.
Theoretical results when γ is close to zero
Plugging p = p * into the first-order conditions (23) and implicitly differentiating these conditions with respect to γ yields
When γ = 0, it follows from (23) and (11) that p * i = α i /2, b ii = 1 and b ij = 0 for i = j. Furthermore, (11) implies that ∂b ij /∂γ| γ=0 = −g ij . Thus, for γ = 0, (29) amounts to
where N (i) is the neighborhood of variety i.
If we look at relative rather than absolute changes in prices in response to an increase in γ, we get
When consumers do not treat a specific variety as their "ideal" one (i.e. when φ = 1), (30) boils down to
where N (i) is the degree of vertex i. Thus, in the special case of φ = 1 both absolute and relative reductions in firm's price triggered by higher substitutability of varieties are proportional to the number of the firm's closest competitors.
Considering another extreme case, φ = 0 (when each consumer focuses entirely on consuming one variety, like in the Hotelling model), we get
Comparing (31) in general depends on φ, it must be that the relationship between these two magnitudes is non-monotone. Thus, the interplay between different types of product differentiation is highly non-trivial.
To illustrate, assume the Chen-Riordan competition (Figure 1d) , where the product-variety network is a star. Let i = 1 be the central node. Then, we have
which is U-shaped in φ for any N ≥ 4.
Finally, note that the results proven for γ = 0 must hold, by continuity, when γ is sufficiently low. Thus, we come to the following result.
Proposition 2.
For sufficiently low values of γ, we have ∂p * /∂γ < 0, i.e. an increase in toughness of local competition γ leads to lower prices.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows: when products are highly locally differentiated, a small reduction in the degree of differentiation makes competition tougher and reduces all prices. However, the magnitude of price reduction depends on both the network structure and the distance decay factor.
Numerical simulations
Let us now understand how γ affects equilibrium prices for larger values of γ. Because we cannot solve analytically this comparative statics analysis, we will resort to numerical simulations.
To illustrate how the equilibrium prices vary with γ, consider a star-shaped network (Chen-Riordan competition) with N = 6. Does the firm located in the star node always enjoy higher monopoly power than the other firms? The answer is no. The firm located at the star node has better access to the market than the periphery firms, but it also faces tougher competition (five direct competitors instead of one). Which of the two effects prevails depends on the value of the substitutability parameter γ. Figure 2 reports the prices of the star firm and a periphery firm, obtained by means of a simulation where φ = 0.6, α = 1, while γ varies between 0 and 0.2, the step of the grid being 0.01.
[Insert F igure 2 here] As shown by Figure 2 , the star firm charges a higher price than the periphery firms if and only if γ does not exceed a threshold value, which is approximately 0.15. When γ is above 0.15, the competition effect deprives the star firm of so much monopoly power that it starts charging a lower price compared to the periphery firms. We also performed simulations for star-shaped networks with a number of nodes different from 6. The results are qualitatively the same as in Figure 2 .
We then perform the same exercise for the line or chain network (Hotelling competition as in Figure 1b ) with N = 5. This network starts at node i = 1 and finishes at node i = 5, where node 3 is the midpoint, nodes 1 and 5 are the endpoints and nodes 2 and 4 are the between nodes. The results are displayed in Figure 3 . We find results similar to that of Figure 2 . Indeed, we see that there is a threshold value of γ (roughly γ = 0.2) for which prices of the endpoint nodes become higher than that of the midpoint nodes. This again highlights the trade off between better access to market and facing tougher competition mentioned above.
[Insert F igure 3 here]
A change in spatial discount factor φ
We now turn to studying how the equilibrium p * varies with φ. Just like in the preceding subsection, we are able to state clear-cut analytical results for low values of γ, while otherwise we proceed with simulations. 14 
Theoretical results when γ is close to zero
Differentiating (23) with respect to φ yields
The following diagonal dominance condition holds for sufficiently low values of γ:
Observe that (35) has the same nature as (21) , but uses ∂α j /∂φ instead of α j as weights.
Using (34) and (35) , it can be shown that the following result holds.
Proposition 3.
For sufficiently low values of γ, we have ∂p * /∂φ > 0, i.e. an increase in spatial discount factor φ leads to higher prices.
The intuition behind this result is as follows: when φ increases, firm i will have less monopoly power over consumer i, but better access to all the other consumers. The latter effect clearly dominates the former when γ is not too large.
Numerical simulations
Let us now understand how φ affects equilibrium prices for larger values of γ. Because we cannot solve analytically this comparative statics, we will resort to numerical simulations.
As above, we will consider a star-shaped network (Chen-Riordan competition) with N = 6. We look at how the equilibrium prices charged by firms located, respectively, at the "star" node and at the "periphery" nodes vary with the spatial discount factor φ. Figure 4 displays the results when γ = 0.15 (which means relatively low substitutability across neighboring varieties, i.e. softer local competition). Figure 5 gives the results when γ = 0.3 (which means relatively high substitutability across neighboring varieties, hence tough local competition). We can see that the results are qualitatively different between these two cases.
When γ = 0.15, we find that the "star" firm enjoys higher monopoly power (that is, charges higher price) than the "peripheral" firms if φ lies in an intermediate domain (from 0.1 to 0.625). Otherwise, peripheral firms price at a higher level. This may be explained by a considerable advantage the "star" firm gains from being a "star" in having better access to the markets. This advantage fades when φ is close to 0 (which means little access to markets other than the local market of a firm) or to 1 (all firms have almost complete access to all markets). Indeed, on the one hand, being a "star" does not yield better market access than the others have. On the other hand, the "star" competes directly with everyone (whereas a "peripheral" firm competes directly with the "star" only), thus bearing a burden of high competitive pressure. As a result, when φ is close to either 0 or 1, the price of the "star" is lower.
[Insert F igure 4 here]
When γ = 0.3, being a "star" is even less of an advantage. Indeed, we see that the firm located at the center always charges a lower price than the "peripheral" firms. On top of it, we have here an example of non-monotone behavior of equilibrium prices with respect to φ, which confirms our results above, which hold when γ is "sufficiently small".
[Insert F igure 5 here] Finally, as above, we perform the same exercise for the line or chain network (Hotelling competition as in Figure 1b ) with N = 5 and for γ = 0. 15 . This network starts at node i = 1 and finishes at node i = 5, where node 3 is the midpoint, nodes 1 and 5 are the endpoints and nodes 2 and 4 are the between nodes. The results are displayed in Figure 6 . We find results similar to that of Figure 4 , even though the picture is more complex. There is a non-monotonic relationship when φ increases and the mid-point firm tends to charge the highest prices when φ has intermediate values. When comparing the between nodes and the endpoint nodes, we see again that the former charge a higher prices only when φ takes intermediate values. This again highlights the trade off between better access to market and facing tougher competition mentioned above.
[Insert F igure 6 here]
Transportation cost versus spatial discount factor
An alternative formulation of the model suggests that consumers' preference for closer varieties is embodied not in the existence of spatial discount factors, but in the presence of positive transportation cost per unit of distance and per unit of consumption, which consumers bear to get access to each variety. Formally, instead of (1), consumer k's utility is now equal to
while the budget constraint is given by
where t is transportation cost per unit of distance, Y k is the income of individual k, and d ik is the geodesic distance between nodes i and k. This formulation assumes that, each time a person k consumes a variety i, she has to pay a commuting cost t per unit of distance (here distance is discrete so each unit is the distance between two adjacent nodes). 15 The inverse demand of consumer k for variety i is then given by:
We can see that the inverse demand given by (37) is the same as the one given by (5) when
In this new framework, the vector of consumer k's individual demands for all varieties are given by:
This leads to the following aggregate demands faced by firms:
where D(G) ≡ (d ij ) i,j∈N is the distance matrix of (N , G).
Let f i stand for the farness of node i, f i ≡ k∈N d ik . Since the closeness centrality C i of node i is usually defined by C i ≡ 1/f i (Jackson, 2008) , the vector f ≡ D(G)1 in (38) can be viewed as the vector of inverse closeness centralities. As a result, the aggregate demand faced by firm i can be written as:
In order to differentiate the impact of willingness-to-pay α from that of transportation cost t on the demand faced by firm i, we rewrite (39) as follows:
where b i ≡ j∈N b ij is the usual Bonacich centrality of node i (u = 1) while b f i ≡ j∈N b ij f j is the weighted Bonacich centrality of node i, where the weights are defined by the farnesses, or, equivalently, the inverse closeness centralities , i.e. u = f . The interaction between Bonacich centrality and closeness centrality shapes the impact of transportation cost t on the aggregate demand faced by firm i. Observe that, in (40) , the impact of the willingness-to-pay α on firm i's demand is fully captured by the Bonacich centrality b i (−γ, G, 1). We can determine the profit of firm i as follows:
Firm i's first-order condition leads to:
This is very close to (24) . We see that the models (spatial discount factor and transportation cost) are very similar. Let us now investigate the comparative statics properties of prices with respect to transportation cost t and see if they are similar to that of prices and φ. By differentiating (42), we obtain:
Hence, the comparative statics of the equilibrium prices p * with respect to transportation cost t is fully captured by b f i . Along the lines of Section 4.2.1, we can show that, using (43), the following result holds: In other words, with the transportation cost model, where α ik = α − td ik , we obtain the same comparative-static result (Proposition 4) as in the spatial discount factor model (Proposition 3), where α ik = αφ d ik . Indeed, when φ increases or t decreases, each firm i has less monopoly power over consumer i but have access to a bigger market. When γ is small enough, the latter effect dominates the former and thus the impact of an increase of φ or a decrease of t on prices is positive. Interestingly, these results are exactly the opposite to those obtained in the standard spatial competition models a la Hotelling where an increase in transportation cost t usually increases the local-monopoly power of firms, which, in turn, increase their prices. To understand why we have a different result, let us revisit the price game in the standard Hotelling's spatial duopoly model. For simplicity, assume that firms 1 and 2 are located at the endpoints of the product space [0, 1] so that x 1 = 0 and x 2 = 1. The demand faced by, say, firm 1 is then given by
where, as above, t > 0 is the transportation cost per unit of distance. To understand the difference between our model and that of Hotelling, let us write the aggregate demand of firm 1 in our model when the network is composed of two firms (dyad). For that, let us rewrite equation (39) for N = 2 and for firm 1. We obtain:
We see that (44) and (45) are similar in many respects; in particular, they are both linear in prices. However, these two demand equations have one fundamental difference. On the one hand, by differentiating (44), we have:
i.e. the own price effect and the cross price effect balance each other. Put differently, in the standard Hotelling model, if both firms increase their prices by the same amount, the demand faced by firm 1 will not change. This indicates a strong substitution effect. On the other hand, if we differentiate (45) , we obtain:
The comparative statics result in the Hotelling model is not anymore true here. Furthermore, using (20) , when the value of γ is close to zero, we have:
This is the main reason why, in Propositions 3 and 4, we obtain the opposite result compared to that of the Hotelling model. Indeed, the demand (44) may be viewed as a limiting case of the one generated by a quadratic utility with a very high substitution term, while we prove our result for sufficiently low values of substitutability across varieties. This argument sheds light on the results of our numerical simulations shown in Figure 6 . When γ is sufficiently high, with a product space (network) as in the Hotelling model, we obtain the opposing result of Proposition 3. In that case, we are back to the standard intuition of the spatial competition models a la Hotelling.
Symmetric equilibrium with regular networks
In the above section, we have studied how the market outcome varies with the degree of substitutability γ and the distance decay factor φ. Another question of interest is how the equilibrium responds to changes in the structure of the network. For example, what happens when competition gets less localized, i.e. when new links emerge without breaking the old ones? It is difficult to answer this question in the general case. To obtain clear-cut results, we now consider a special case when the equilibrium in the price-setting game is symmetric, i.e. when p * i = p * for all i ∈ N . The necessary and sufficient condition for the equilibrium to be symmetric is given by:
where µ is a scalar independent of j.
The right-hand side of (47) is independent of φ, while the left-hand side is, by (17) , a polynomial of φ. It can be shown that (47) holds for any φ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if both α i (φ, G) and b ii are the same for all i ∈ N . Furthermore, α i (φ, G) = α j (φ, G) is equivalent to the following condition:
for any k ≤ d, and for any i, j ∈ N , N k (i) = N k (j).
Condition (48) tells us that, for a symmetric equilibrium to exist, the network (N , G) has to be "symmetric" in some sense. The weakest concept of symmetry for networks is regularity. Recall that a network is regular if all nodes have the same degree r < N , which is sometimes called the valency of a regular graph. However, regularity of (N , G) is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for (48) to hold. A counterexample is given by the Frucht graph (Biggs, 1974) . The Frucht graph is a 3-regular graph (i.e. it is a regular because each node has 3 edges) with 12 nodes, a total of 18 edges but it is not symmetric. Its radius is 3, its diameter is 4 and its girth is 3 (the girth of a graph is the length of a shortest cycle contained in the graph). Figure 7 displays the Frucht graph. (48) is that the network is vertex transitive. Vertex transitivity means that, for any i, j ∈ N , there exists an automorphism of (N , G) that maps i into j. Moreover, vertex transitivity implies that b ii = b jj for all i ∈ N also holds. More intuitively, the network is vertex transitive if all nodes have the same centrality measure (this has to be true for any centrality measure). For example, the Frucht graph is regular but nodes do not have the same eigenvector centrality (different distance distribution). Clearly, the complete (Chamberlain-type) and the circle (Salop-type) networks are vertex transitive.
A network is regular if and only if r −1 G is a bistochastic matrix. Moreover, in this case r = λ max (G). Thus, (8) boils down to γr < 1. The unique interior symmetric equilibrium price p * is then given by
ii + ....
Using equation (49), we can study how prices change when competition becomes less localized, which we model by adding new links to the network without removing the existing ones, and keeping the set of nodes unchanged. To be precise, assume that the network changes from (N , G) to (N , G ), where (i) both G and G are regular, and (ii) G is obtained from G by adding new links, without removing the old ones. In particular, this means that the valency r of G exceeds r, which is the valency of G. We have the following result:
Assume that γ is sufficiently small while φ ∈ (0, 1). Then, both the numerator and the denominator of (49) increase when G changes to G .
The intuition behind this lemma is as follows. When competition gets less localized, two effects are at work. First, the numerator of (49) captures the market access effect, which results in skewing the distribution of distances (how many nodes are at distance 1 from i, at distance 2 from i, etc.) toward zero, thus bringing all consumers closer to each firm. Second, the numerator of (49) captures the competition effect since competition gets tougher as new links arise. The lemma basically states that the two effects work in the opposite directions: the market access effect always drives prices upwards, while competition effect leads to a reduction in prices. Which of the two effects dominates is a priori ambiguous. Indeed, the total change in prices is given by 
Further implications of our model
In this section, we further analyze some interesting properties of our model and put forward the importance of network structure on equilibrium outcomes.
Herfindahl index
Antitrust authorities often use the Herfindahl index to measure market concentration. The index is defined as n i=1 s 2 i where s i is firm i's market share. We follow Tirole (1988) and use firm's output to calculate market shares, so that the (equilibrium) market share of firm i in network G is given by:
where q * i (G) is the equilibrium quantity of variety i produced by firm i operating in network G and Q * (G) is the total equilibrium quantity of all varieties produced in network G. Clearly, n i=1 s * i (G) = 1. From equation (5), we can calculate the equilibrium quantity of variety i produced by firm i as follows:
We have seen that
where the equilibrium prices p * i and p * j are determined in (26) .
When a symmetric equilibrium exists (i.e. when a network is regular and vertex-transitive, see Section 5 above), all firms produce the same quantity. Hence, the Herfindahl index always attains its minimum value, which is 1/N . For this reason, Chamberlinian product space ( Fig. 1a ) and Salop-type product space (Figure 1c ) with the same number N of varieties/nodes always feature the same value 1/N of the Herfindahl index, which does not depend on toughness of local competition γ, nor on the spatial discount factor φ.
In order to better understand how industrial concentration varies with the network structure, we consider two simple irregular networks with N = 4 varieties and 4 consumers: the Hotelling network ( Fig. 1b ) and the Chen-Riordan network (Fig. 1d) . Figure 8 shows how the Herfindahl index varies with γ in both these cases. We take γ ∈ [0, 0.25], and φ = 0.5.
[Insert F igure 8 here]
Interestingly, there is no clear prediction on which market is more concentrated. It depends on the parameters φ (spatial discount factor) and γ (which is the inverse measure of product differentiation) and on the network structure. As can be seen from Figure 8 , if we compare Hotelling competition (chain network) with Chen-Riordan competition (star network) under φ = 0.5 , then, for γ between 0.044 and 0.192, the market is more concentrated in Hotelling competition than in the Chen-Riordan competition, while otherwise the opposite result holds true. This result is related to what we found in Section 4 where we show that, in a star-shaped network, the firm located in the star node does not always enjoy higher monopoly power than the peripheral firms.
Network versus non-network effects
Assume φ = 1. Then, in the complete network (Chamberlinian competition), we have pure monopolistic competition since
This is exactly the result for the benchmark monopolistic competition model without network (see Combes. Mayer, Thisse, Chap. 3). What do we gain by having a network approach? If we differentiate (50), we obtain:
∂p * ∂α > 0 , ∂p * ∂n < 0 and ∂p * ∂γ 0 ⇔ γn 1
In Section 4, we have seen that, with a more general approach in terms of networks, the comparativestatics results are quite different. For example, we have shown the importance of the spatial discount factor φ in evaluating the impact of γ on prices. Also, we have seen that these comparative-statics results crucially depend on the network structure and that the most "central" firms in a network do not always enjoy higher monopoly power than other firms and thus do not always charge higher prices. We have seen, for example, that for a star-shaped network, the firm located in the star node (the most "central" firm) does not always enjoy higher monopoly power than the other firms. This is because the firm located at the star node has better access to the market than the periphery firms, but it also faces tougher competition (all peripheral firms instead of one). Interestingly, Firgo et al. (2015) find empirically a similar result. Using data from the retail gasoline market of Vienna, Austria, they show that the relationship between centrality and pricing in a spatially differentiated market is not significant. 16 They explain their results by the existence of two countervailing effects: centrality implies a larger number of consumers (higher prices) but, at the same time, is associated with a larger number of direct competitors (lower prices). This is exactly what our model is also predicting but provides a more precise test of this relationship. For example, they only use the degree centrality while, in our model any measure of centrality (see Jackson, 2008) , such as betweenness or eigenvector centrality, could be used.
Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a new model of price competition, which combines features of both spatial and monopolistic competition, thus encompassing two very different aspects of product differentiation: love for variety and consumers' location-specific taste heterogeneity. As a consequence, our model allows for a rich set of regimes of imperfect competition. The salient feature of our setting is that we model the product space as a network, where link between two varieties exists if and only if they are direct substitutes, while consumer's willingness to pay decays with the geodesic distance of a specific variety from her ideal variety. Thus, consumers exhibit love for variety, as in monopolistic competition, but are willing to pay less for more distant varieties, like in the address approach. Chamberlin-type or Hotelling-type of competition are obtained as a limiting case when the substitutability network is a complete graph or a chain. We show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in prices where each equilibrium price is a function of the weighted Bonacich centrality of the firm. We also investigate how the degree of product differentiation and the spatial discount factor affect the equilibrium prices. We find that, when products are highly differentiated, a small reduction in the degree of differentiation makes competition tougher and reduces all prices. However, the magnitude of price reduction depends on both the network structure and the distance decay factor. If, for example, we consider a star-shaped network, we find that the firm located at the star node does not always enjoy higher monopoly power than the other firms. This is because the firm located at the star node has better access to the market than the periphery firms, but it also faces tougher competition (all peripheral firms instead of one). We also study symmetric equilibria and show how denser networks affect prices. Finally, we analyze some other implications of our model by calculating the Herfindahl index (which measures market competitiveness) and determining the role of networks in monopolistic competition.
We believe that this paper provides a methodological contribution by modeling firms' and consumers' heterogeneity by their position in the network of product varieties. We also believe that our model could be used to analyze issues related to economic geography, international trade, economic growth, etc. We finally hope that our contribution will spur further research in these directions. G is a cycle G is a star
